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Article 3

NEVER ON SUNDAY:
THE BLUE LAWS CONTROVERSY
NEIL

J. DILLOFF*

No day of the week has spawned as many legal disputes as
Sunday.' Many normal daily pursuits such as working, contracting,
mailing letters and engaging in recreational activities are affected by
whether or not they occur on Sunday. Limitations on these activities are
a result of Sunday closing laws (or "blue laws") passed by both state and
local governments. This article will discuss and analyze the most
commonly litigated Sunday restriction - restrictions imposed on the
sale of merchandise to the public.
2
Sunday closing laws are enacted pursuant to a state's police power
to preserve the health, safety, and welfare of its citizenry. As such, the
laws are generally presumed to be a valid exercise of this power.3 Blue
laws are unique, however, because they impose criminal sanctions on
what is generally regarded as legitimate commercial enterprise, merely
because such commerce occurs on a particular day of the week.
It is well established that Sunday is not only a day set aside for
religious observance 4 but also a recognized, and often enforced, day of
rest. In 1961 the United States Supreme Court rendered a series of

* A.B. 1970, University of North Carolina; J.D. 1973, Georgetown University Law
Center. Member of the Maryland and Pennsylvania Bars. Associate, Piper & Marbury,

Baltimore, Maryland. Mr. Dilloff represented one of the defendants in Maryland's most
recent blue laws case, Supermarkets General Corp. v. Maryland, 286 Md. 611, 409 A.2d
250 (1979), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 45 (1980). The author wishes to acknowledge the
research assistance provided by Jonathan D. Smith, Esq.
1. The lawyers' debt to Sunday can best be demonstrated by a review of the separate
listing of Sunday to the exclusion of any other day of the week in such legal digests as
WEST'S FEDERAL PRACTICE DIGEST 2d (1978), WEST'S MARYLAND DIGEST (1966), AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE 2d (1978), and CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM (1977).
2. See, e.g., Supermkt. Gen. Corp. v. Maryland, 286 Md. 611, 616, 409 A.2d 250, 253

(1979), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 45 (1980); see also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,
444-45 (1961).
3. Supermkt. General Corp. v. Maryland, 286 Md. 611, 616, 409 A.2d 250, 253
(1979), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 45 (1980).
4. See Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt. Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1961); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1966); Two Guys v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961). See also
Braunfled v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
Interestingly, the fourth commandment directs abstention from labor on the
Sabbath, the seventh day of the week - Saturday. To those of the Jewish faith, Saturday
remains the Sabbath, but Christians recognize Sunday as the day of rest and worship. See,
e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
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opinions upholding Sunday closing laws in Maryland,5 Massachusetts,'
and Pennsylvania.7 Despite these rulings blue laws have continued to
be challenged as unconstitutional under both federal and state constitutions.
At one point in time, state regulation of Sunday commerce was so
prevalent that forty-six states had Sunday closing laws.' Now, however,
only twenty states have statewide Sunday sales restrictions. 9 The
decline in the number of jurisdictions retaining blue laws can be
attributed both to state legislative repeal of the laws, and to judicial
decisions declaring the particular regulatory scheme invalid. For
various reasons, including unfavorable judicial decisions concerning the
validity of the laws, twenty state legislatures have repealed their
Sunday closing laws.' ° Additionally, courts have found twenty-three

5. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
6. Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt. Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1961).
7. Two Guys v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599
(1961).
8. During the heyday of blue laws, only Alaska, Montana and Nevada were without
Sunday closing statutes. Hawaii had blue laws when it was a territory, but not after it
achieved statehood in 1959; the District of Columbia also had no blue laws.
9. ALA. CODE § 13-6-1 (1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-3852-3863 (Rep. Vol. 1977);
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 436.160 (Baldwin 1975); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § § 51:191-95 (West
1965 & Supp. 1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 3204 (Supp. 1979); MD. ANN. CODE art.
27, § 492, et seq. (Repl. Vol. 1976 & Cum. Supp. 1979); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 136,
§§ 5-6 (West 1974 & Cum. Supp. 1979); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 97-23-63, 67 (1972); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 578.100 (Vernon 1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-940 (1975); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 332-D:1-6 (Cum. Supp. 1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-30-01 (1976); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, §§ 907-08 (West 1958); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-23-2 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1979);
S.C. CODE §§ 53-1-40, 100 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4001 (1975); TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 9001 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1979) (option of choosing Saturday or Sunday);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 3351-56 (Cum. Supp. 1979); VA. CODE §§ 18.2-341-2 (Supp.
1979); W. VA. CODE §§ 61-10-25, 26 (1977).
For a general discussion concerning the decline of the blue laws in the various
states, see Note, Sunday Closing Laws in the United States: An Unconstitutional
Anachronism, 11 SUFF. L. REV. 1089 (1977).
10. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 299-301 (West 1876) (repealed by Act of February 8,
1883, ch. 2, [1883] Cal. Stats. 1); REV. CODE DEL. § 5263 (4) (1935) (repealed by Act of
March 14, 1941, ch. 238, [1941] Del. Laws 1016-17; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 855.01-04,
855.06-.07 (1965) (repealed by Act of June 15, 1969 ch. 69-87, § 1, [1969] Fla. Laws
322.23); REV. LAWS HAWAII §§ 11610-11615 (1945) (repealed by 1949 Hawaii Sess. Laws,
ch. 279, D-269, Act 95); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 17-2503 (1932) (repealed by Act of January
14, 1939), ch. 7 § 1, [1939] Idaho Sess. Laws 21); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 549 (1961)
(repealed by Act of July 28, 1961,\art. 35 § 35-1 [1961] Ill. Laws 2044); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 35-1-86-1 (Burns 1975) (repealed by 1977 Ind. Acts. P.L. 26 § 25); IowA CODE § 729
(1954) (repealed by Act of March 24, 1955, ch. 273, [1955] Iowa Acts 291); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 21-964 to 969 (1964) (repealed by Act of April 19, 1965, ch. 233, § 1 [19651 Kan. Sess.
Laws 480); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 435.51-59 (1948) (repealed by Act of May 28, 1968, Pub.
Act No. 58, § 1 [1968] Mich. Pub. Acts 96-97); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325.91, et. seq. (West
1967) (repealed by 1971 Minn. Laws, ch. 71, § 3, H.F. No. 251) (Minnesota retains a
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states' schemes unconstitutional, in whole or in part,1 1 while sixteen
states have had their blue laws upheld.' 2 Most recently, in Supermarstatute regulating a wide range of industries however, see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.02
(West 1964)); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A-171-4-5.8 (West 1971) (repealed by 1978 N.J. Laws,
ch. 95 § 2C:98-2, effective September 1, 1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-44-1 to -5 (1953)
(repealed by Act of March 25, 1963, ch. 303, § 30.1 [1963] N.M. Laws 907-08); OHuo REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 3773.23-.24 (Page 1953) (repealed by Act of August 22, 1973, House Bill 59
§ 2 [1973] Ohio Laws 1179-81); LORD'S ORE. LAWS § 2125 (1910) (repealed by an act
proposed by initiative petition and approved by voters on November 7, 1916, [1920] Ore.
Laws § 2125; S.D. COMP. LAWS §§ 22-26-2 (1967) (repealed by 1976 S.D. Sess. Laws, ch.

158 § 26-1); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-55-1 to -2 (1953) (repealed by Act of February 12,
1970, ch. 25 § 9 [1970] Utah Laws 59); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.76.010 (1961) (repealed
by Act of June 27, 1975, ch. 260, § 9A.92.010 (196-99), 1975 Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess.
865); Wis. STAT. §§ 351.46-49 (1931) (repealed by Act of April 13, 1933, ch. 74, [1933] Wis.
Laws 244); Wyo. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 7276 (1920) (repealed by Act of March 3, 1931, ch. 73,
§ 179 [1931] Wyo. Sess. Laws 136-37). In several cases, the law was repealed after it was
declared unconstitutional by the state court.
In five states (Connecticut, Georgia, New York, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania) general Sunday closing laws have been held unconstitutional but have not yet been
repealed.
11. Entire statewide schemes have been struck down in the following cases: Caldor's
Inc. v. Bedding Barn, Inc., 177 Conn. 304, 417 A.2d 343 (1979); Kelly v. Blackburn, 95 So.
2d 260 (Fla. 1957); Henderson v. Antonacci, 62 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1952); Rutledge v. Gaylord's,
Inc., 233 Ga. 694, 213 S.E.2d 626 (1975); Boyer v. Ferguson, 192 Kan. 607, 389 P.2d 775
(1964); Arlan's Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Kelley, 374 Mich. 70, 130 N.W.2d 892 (1964);
Minnesota v. Target Stores, Inc., 279 Minn. 447, 156 N.W.2d 908 (1968); New York v.
Abrahams, 40 N.Y.2d 277, 353 N.E.2d 574 (1976); Treasure City Inc. v. Clark, 261 N.C.
130, 134 S.E.2d 97 (1964); Kroger Co. v. O'Hara Township, 481 Pa. 101, 392 A.2d 266
(1978); Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc. v. Ashley, 26 Utah 2d 38, 484 P.2d 723 (1971).
Courts have held local ordinances or portions of statewide schemes unconstitutional
in the following cases: Piggly-Wiggly Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 336 So. 2d 1078 (Ala.
1976); Elliott v. Arizona, 29 Ariz. 389, 242 P. 340 (1926); Ex parte Westerfield, 55 Cal. 550
(1880); Ex parte Newman, 9 Cal. 502 (1858); Dunbar v. Hoffman, 171 Colo. 481, 468 P.2d
742 (1970); Rogers v. Delaware, 57 Del. 334, 199 A.2d 895 (1964); Pacesetter Homes, Inc.
v. Village of S. Holland, 18 Ill. 2d 247, 163 N.E.2d 464 (1959); West v. Town of Winnsboro,
252 La. 605, 211 So. 2d 665 (1967) (the general statewide law was upheld in Louisiana v.
Scallan, 374 So. 2d 1232 (La. 1979)); McKaig v. Kansas City, 363 Mo. 1033, 256 S.W.2d
815 (1953); Skag-Way Dep't Stores, Inc. v. City of Omaha, 179 Neb. 707, 140 N.W.2d 28
(1966); North Carolina v. Greenwood, 280 N.C. 651, 187 S.E.2d 8 (1972); Ohio v. Grimes,
23 Ohio Op.2d 96, 190 N.E.2d 588 (1963); Spartan's Indus., Inc. v. Oklahoma City, 498
P.2d 399 (Okla. 1972); County of Spokane v. Valu-Mart, Inc., 69 Wash. 2d 712, 419 P.2d
993 (1966); Nation v. Giant Drug Co., 396 P.2d 431 (Wyo. 1964).
12. Woonsocket Prescription Center, Inc. v. Michaelson, 417 F. Supp. 1250 (D.R.I.
1976); Bill Dyer Supply Co. v. Arkansas, 502 S.W.2d 496 (Ark. 1974); Brown Enterprises,
Inc. v. Fulton, 192 N.W.2d 773 (Iowa 1972); Louisiana v. Scallon, 374 So. 2d 1232 (La.
1979); Maine v. S.S. Kresge, Inc., 364 A.2d 868 (Me. 1976); Supermkt. Gen. Corp. v.
Maryland, 286 Md. 611,409 A.2d 250 (1979), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 45 (1980); Zayre Corp.
v. Attorney General, 372 Mass. 423, 362 N.E.2d 878 (1977); Genesco, Inc. v. J.C. Penney
Co. 313 So. 2d 20 (Miss. 1975); Opinion of the Justices, 108 N.H. 103, 229 A.2d 188 (1967);
Vornado, Inc. v. Hyland, 77 N.J. 347, 390 A.2d 606 (1978); City of Bismarck v. Materi, 177
N.W.2d 530 (N.D. 1970) (municipal ordinance); South Carolina v. Smith, 247 S.E.2d 331
(S.C. 1978); Whitney Trading Corp. v. McLeod, 255 S.C.8,176 S.E.2d 572 (1970); Gibson
Prod. Co. v. Texas, 545 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. 1976) (5-4 decision); Vermont v. Giant of St.
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kets General Corporationv. Maryland, 3 the Maryland Court of Appeals
sustained the validity of Maryland's blue laws.
Sunday closing laws have been attacked upon a variety of grounds.
Claims that the laws violate the free exercise and establishment of
religion clauses of the first amendment have consistently failed because
courts have been virtually unanimous in finding that the blue laws
have a primarily secular purpose.' 4 When state courts have struck down
blue laws, they have done so based upon constitutional grounds, such as
due process i5 and equal protection,' 6 and other grounds such as
monopoly, 17 discriminatory enforcement,' 8 invalid delegation of legislative power to counties,' 9 and violations of particular state constitutional
provisions prohibiting special laws. 20 Because many judicial decisions
strike down blue laws due to the means by which the laws are enforced
(as opposed to the state's power to enact them), courts have attempted to
provide guidance in proper methods of enforcing Sunday trade restrictions.
To evaluate properly the validity of challenges to blue laws, and the
constitutionality of state enforcement approaches, it is necessary to
review briefly the history and purpose of Sunday closing legislation.
I.

HISTORY AND PURPOSE

Sunday legislation has been in existence since 321 A.D. "when
Constantine the Great passed an edict commanding all judges and
inhabitants of cities to rest on the venerable day of the sun.",2 1 Although
secular work on Sunday was not violative of English common law,

Albans, Inc., 128 Vt. 539, 268 A.2d 739 (1970); Malibu Auto Parts, Inc. v. Virginia, 218
Va. 453, 237 S.E.2d 782 (1977); West Virginia ex rel. Heck's, Inc. v. Gates, 149 W. Va. 421,
141 S.E.2d 369 (1965).
13. 286 Md. 611, 409 A.2d 250 (1979) cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 45 (1980).
14. See text at notes 24-29 and 113-26 infra.
15. See, e.g., Rutledge v. Gaylord's, Inc., 233 Ga. 694, 213 S.E.2d 626 (1975). See also
text at notes 170-187 infra.
16. See, eg., Caldor's Inc. v. Bedding Barn, Inc., 177 Conn. 304, 417 A.2d 343 (1979).
See also text at notes 141-69 infra.
17. See, e.g., Boyer v. Ferguson, 192 Kan. 607, 389 P.2d 775 (1964). See also text at
notes 127-40 infra.
18. See, e.g., New York v. Acme Mkt. Inc., 37 N.Y.2d 326, 334 N.E.2d 555, 372
N.Y.S.2d 590 (1975). See also text at notes 188-97 infra.
19. See, e.g., Arlan's Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Kelley, 374 Mich. 70, 130 N.W.2d 892
(1964).
20. See, e.g., Kroger Co. v. O'Hara Township, 481 Pa. 101, 392 A.2d 266 (1978) (as
well as holding law unconstitutional on other grounds).
21. 83 C.J.S. Sunday § 3A at 800-01 (1953). See also Missouri v. Malone, 238 Mo.
App. 939, 941, 192 S.W.2d 68, 70 (1946).
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statutes were enacted beginning in 1676 prohibiting work on Sunday.2 2
The initial English law, which became the basis for virtually all of the
Sunday closing legislation in the United States, read as follows:
For the better observation and keeping holy the Lord's day. . all
. . . persons. . shall on every Lord's day apply themselves to the
observation of the same, by exercising . . the duties of piety and
true religion, publicly and privately . . and . . . no tradesman,
artificer, workman, labourer, or other person whatsoever, shall do
or exercise any worldly labour, business or work of their ordinary
callings, upon the Lord's day, or any part thereof (work of necessity
and charity only excepted: . . .).23
Despite the clearly religious origins of Sunday closing laws, in
McGowan v. Maryland2 4 the United States Supreme Court found blue
laws to have secular purposes of "provid[ing] a day of rest for working
persons and an atmosphere of tranquility in which to enjoy it,"'25
"provid[ing] a day of rest for all citizens (presumably encompassing both
working and non-working), 26 and "set[ting] one day apart from all
others as a day of rest, repose, recreation and tranquility - a day which
all members of the family and community have the opportunity to spend
and enjoy together."27 These purposes "have become part and parcel of
this great governmental concern wholly apart from their original
[religious] purposes or connotations." 28 Although Sunday closing laws
arguably are unnecessary in light of other federal and state constitutional and statutory provisions which prevent forced labor in violation
of an individual worker's rights,29 many legislatures have found it
necessary to enact such laws.
Some controversy has resulted in arriving at a satisfactory
definition of "the day of rest." Several states have enacted laws which do
not specify a particular day of rest, but merely require that an employer

22. Sunday Observance Act, 1676, 29 Car. 2, c. 7. See Note, Sunday Laws, 43 N.C. L.
REV. 123, 124 (1964).
23. Note, supra note 22, at 124.
24. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
25. Id. at 449-50.
26. Id. at 445.
27. Id. at 450.
28. Id. at 445.
29. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j), 2000e-2(a)(1) (1972), (construed in Draper v.
United States Pipe and Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515 (6th Cir. 1975) (employer required to
make reasonable efforts to accommodate employee's observation of his Sabbath); Blakely
v. Chrysler Corp. 407 F. Supp. 1227 (E.D. Mo. 1975); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B § 16 (1979
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grant an employee one consecutive twenty-four hour period of rest per
week. 3' The McGowan court, however, implied that such laws do not
adequately fulfill the objective of providing a uniform day of rest
because they do not insure that all members of a family will receive the
same day off. 3 Other states' laws, such as Georgia's former blue law,
provide that businesses operating on both Saturdays and Sundays are
required to be closed on one of the two days.3 2
Like many laws which seek to protect some public interest, blue
laws do not affect all people in the same way. For example, should a
consumer decide to shop on Sunday in a blue law state, the state,
through its blue law, essentially tells the citizen that such activity is
prohibited for his "own good.",3 3 It is indeed ironic that blue laws may,
in many cases, work to prevent a day of rest, repose and recreation for
those persons who find Sunday shopping to be a recreational activity.3 a

Rep. Vol.). See generally U.S. CONST. amend. I (freedom of religion), amend. XIII
(prohibition of slavery).
In the Report of the Governor's Commission to Study the Operation of the Sunday
Blue Laws (1975), the following statute was proposed as Article 85 § 65 in conjunction
with a recommendation of abolition of Maryland's blue law scheme.
(A) It is the policy of the State of Maryland that a person should not be denied the
opportunity to work because he does not wish to work on the Sabbath of his choosing.
An employer may not deny employment to a person solely on the basis of his refusal to
work on a particular day which he observes as his Sabbath or day of rest. An employer
may not discharge, discipline, discriminate against, or penalize an employee for
exercising his right to observe a day of rest.
(B) In order to implement the provisions of this section, the Commissioner of labor
and industry shall establish a procedure for the filing of complaints based on alleged
violations of subsection (A). The Commissioner shall establish a procedure for the
holding of hearings on such complaints.
(C) The Commissioner may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to enforce any
order issued pursuant to this section.
(D) A person aggrieved by a decision or order of the Commissioner may seek judicial
review in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act and the Maryland Rules.
(E) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent a person from filing a
complaint in accordance with the provisions of Article 49B of the Code.
See also MD.ANN. CODE art. 27 §§ 534H & 534J.
30. See, e.g., CAL. LABOR CODE ANN. §§ 550-56 (West 1971); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48,
§ 8a-h (Smith Hurd 1969 & Supp. 1977); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 48 (West 1971);
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 103.85 (West 1974).

31. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 450-51 (1961).
32. The Georgia blue law was declared unconstitutional in Rutledge v. Gaylord's,
Inc., 233 Ga. 694, 213 S.E.2d 626 (1975). The method of requiring Sunday closings on
either Saturday or Sunday was criticized as a "Saturday closing or Sunday closing of
Retail Business Act." Id. at 701, 213 S.E.2d at 631 (Gunter, J., concurring specially).
33. Vornado, Inc. v. Hyland, 77 N.J. 347, 366, 390 A.2d 606, 616 (1978) (Pashman, J.,
dissenting).
34. Id. at 367, 390 A.2d at 617.
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In addition, employees seeking to earn extra income, as well as
employers desiring to conduct business on Sundays, are prevented from
doing so. The threshold problem is that Sunday legislation may infringe
upon the rights of consumers, certain employees, and proprietors by
attempting to protect the rights of a worker who does not desire Sunday
employment. The optimal legislative goal should be to draft a law to
protect these potentially conflicting interests.
Blue law schemes which are local (as opposed to statewide) in
nature tend to diminish the efficacy of achieving the stated purpose of
Sunday closing laws. In such situations, what may be legal in one
county or municipality may be illegal in another. The effect of such a
patchwork is to encourage shoppers to travel to those areas within a
state which allow Sunday trade, thus protecting some, but not all,
citizens from Sunday labor. This fragmented approach seems to run
afoul of the basic purpose of providing all the citizens in a particular
state with the benefits of rest and relaxation.3 5 States which espouse
this statewide purpose but which have delegated to subdivisions the
authority to enact local blue laws have, in effect, determined that there
is no longer a statewide governmental interest in enforcing Sunday
closing legislation.
Because of the diverse methods by which states have attempted to
effectuate the purported blue law goal of providing a uniform day of rest
for all citizens of a state, some courts have begun to question the
legislature's genuine motivation for enacting Sunday closing laws. For
example, in Skag-Way Department Stores, Inc. v. Omaha,3 6 the Nebraska Supreme Court said:
The real purposes of the ordinances are not to provide a uniform
day of rest, nor to promote family unity, nor to encourage religious
observances. Their real purposes are to enlist the power of the state
to protect business interests. We submit that the ordinances are

35. In Maryland, for example, there are no Sunday prohibitions against trade in
Dorchester, Montgomery, Prince Georges, or Worcester counties. See, MD. ANN. CODE art.
27 §§ 492(1), 521(k), 522(1), 534G-534J, 534T (1976 and Cum. Supp. 1978). Contingent
upon a referendum to be held in Talbot County in November, 1980, similar repeal of
Sunday closing restrictions may occur. Ch. 523 [1979] Md. Laws 1503. Other examples of
past or present purported statewide schemes exempting certain subdivisions within the
state are GA..CODE ANN. §§ 96-1201, 1204 (1974); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 578.100(5) (Vernon
Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:171-5.12 (1971) (repealed by 1978 N.J. Laws ch. 95
§ 2C:98-2, effective Sept. 1, 1979) (former law effective in ten of twenty-one counties);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-346.2 (1969) (declared unconstitutional); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2341-2 (Supp. 1979); W. VA. CODE ANN. §61-10-28 (1977).
36. 179 Neb. 707, 140 N.W.2d 28 (1966).
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discriminatory as to those businesses included within its terms as
against those who labor or sell merchandise no less harmful or no
less against the public interest.3 7
Most courts, however, have deferred to the legislature's wisdom and
have refused to consider whether blue laws "are attributable to the
efforts of so-called special interests.
II.

METHODS OF SUNDAY REGULATION

Once it is determined that a Sunday closing law is desirable, the
next step is to enact the legislation. Methods adopted by state
legislatures for regulating Sunday commerce have been diverse. Regulation by business size (as determined by the number of employees) has
been a favored approach. 39 Regulation by occupation or type of business
40
has also been a prevalent means of enforcing Sunday closings.
Restricting the types of commodities permitted to be sold on Sundays is
yet a third popular mechanism for insuring a day of rest for all state

37. Id. at 712, 140 N.W.2d at 32; see also Terry Carpenter, Inc. v. Wood, 177 Neb. 515,
525, 129 N.W.2d 475, 483 (1964).
38. New York v. Abrahams, 40 N.Y.2d 277, 283, 353 N.E.2d 574, 577, 386 N.Y.S. 2d
661 n.4 (1976). See also Supermkt. Gen. Corp. v. Maryland, 286 Md. 611, 409 A.2d 250
(1979), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 45 (1980); Minnesota v. Target Stores, Inc., 279 Minn. 447,
156 N.W.2d 908 (1968); Genesco, Inc. v. J.C. Penney Co., 313 So. 2d 20, 24 (Miss. 1975).
39. See, e.g., statutes considered in Woonsocket Prescription Center, Inc. v. Michaelson, 417 F. Supp. 1250 (D.R.I. 1976); Piggly-Wiggly, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 336 So. 2d
1078 (Ala. 1976); Caldor's, Inc. v. Bedding Barn, Inc., 177 Conn. 304, 417 A.2d 343 (1979);
Boyer v. Ferguson, 192 Kan. 607, 389 P.2d 775 (1964); Maine v. S.S. Kresge, Inc., 364 A.2d
868 (Me. 1976); Supermkts. Gen. Corp. v. Maryland, 286 Md. 611, 409 A.2d 250 (1979),
cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 45 (1980); Giant of Md., Inc. v. State's Attorney, 267 Md. 501, 298
A.2d 427 (1973), appeal dismissed, 412 U.S. 915 (1973); Richard's Furniture Corp. v.
Board. of County Comm'rs., 233 Md. 249, 196 A.2d 621 (1964); Zayre Corp. v. Attorney
General, 372 Mass. 423, 362 N.E.2d 878 (1977); Opinion of the Justices, 108 N.H. 103, 229
A.2d 188 (1967), City of Bismarck v. Materi, 177 N.W.2d 530 (N.D. 1970); Bertera's
Hopewell Foodland, Inc. v. Masters, 428 Pa. 20, 236 A.2d 197 (1967), appeal dismissed,
390 U.S. 597 (1968).
40. See, e.g., statutes considered in Elliott v. Arizona, 29 Ariz. 389, 242 P. 340 (1926);
Dunbar v. Hoffman, 171 Colo. 481, 468 P.2d 742 (1970); Caldor's, Inc. v. Bedding Barn,
Inc., 177 Conn. 304, 417 A.2d 343 (1979); Rogers v. Delaware, 57 Del. 334, 199 A.2d 895
(1964); Kelly v. Blackburn, 95 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1957); Henderson v. Antonacci, 62 So. 2d 5
(Fla. 1952); Rutledge v. Gaylord's, Inc., 233 Ga. 694, 213 S.E.2d 626 (1975); Zayre Corp. v.
Attorney General, 372 Mass. 423, 362 N.E.2d 878 (1977); Genesco, v. J.C. Penney Co., 313
So. 2d 20 (Miss. 1975); North Carolina v. Greenwood, 280 N.C. 651, 187 S.E.2d 8 (1972);
Spartan's Indus., Inc. v. Oklahoma City, 498 P.2d 399 (Okla. 1972); County of Spokane v.
Valu-Mart, Inc., 69 Wash. 2d 712, 419 P.2d 993 (1966); Malibu Auto Parts, Inc. v.
Virginia, 218 Va. 453, 237 S.E.2d 782 (1977).
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citizens.4 1 Additionally, some states have attempted to regulate Sunday
trade by a maximum hours limitation,4 2 by geographic area,4 3 by the
clientele permitted to purchase goods on Sunday," or by a blanket
prohibition against all business activity on Sunday. 45 As can be
anticipated, each of these methods of regulation has given rise to
various objections by challengers. The following analysis will help in
understanding the various ways by which states regulate Sunday sales,
the challenges to those restrictions, and the permissible scope of the
regulations.
A.

Regulation by Size of Establishment

Courts have generally upheld, as consistent with the law's objective, the regulation of Sunday trade based upon the size of the business
establishment.4 6 This regulatory method usually focuses upon the
number of persons to be employed at a particular establishment on
Sunday. 47 While blue laws normally limit the number of permissible
Sunday employees to no more than five or six, 48 some courts have
41. See, e.g., statutes considered in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Bill
Dyer Supply Co. v. Arkansas, 255 Ark. 613, 502 S.W.2d 496 (1974); Boyer v. Ferguson,
192 Kan. 607, 389 P.2d 775 (1964); Minnesota v. Target Stores, Inc., 279 Minn. 447, 156
N.W.2d 908 (1968); Spartan's Indus., Inc. v. Oklahoma City, 498 P.2d 399 (Okla. 1972);
Gibson Prod. Co., Inc. v. Texas, 545 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. 1976); West Virginia ex rel Heck's,
Inc. v. Gates, 149 W.,Va. 421, 141 S.E.2d 369 (1965).
42. Woonsocket Prescription Center, Inc. v. Michaelson, 417 F. Supp. 1250 (D.R.I.
1976).
43. Dunbar v. Hoffman, 171 Colo. 481, 468 P.2d 742 (1970); Treasure City v. Clark,
261 N.C. 130, 134 S.E.2d 97 (1964).
44. County of Spokane v. Valu-Mart, Inc., 69 Wash. 2d 712, 419 P.2d 993 (1966).
45. Pacesetter Homes, Inc. v. Village of S. Holland, 18 Ill. 2d 247, 163 N.E.2d 464
(1959).
The cases are split on whether total prohibition is constitutional. Compare
Henderson v. Antonacci, 62 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1952) and Kroger Co. v. O'Hara Township, 481
Pa. 101, 392 A.2d 266 (1978) (Larson, J., concurring) with Pacesetter Homes, Inc. v.
Village of S. Holland, 18 Ill. 2d 247, 163 N.E.2d 464 (1959).
46. Woonsocket Prescription Center, Inc. v. Michaelson, 417 F. Supp. 1250 (D.R.I.
1976); Maine v. S.S. Kresge Inc., 364 A.2d 868 (Me. 1976); Giant of Md., Inc. v. State's
Attorney, 267 Md. 501, 298 A.2d 427 (1973); Opinion of the Justices, 108 N.H. 103, 229
A.2d 188 (1967); City of Bismarck v. Materi, 177 N.W.2d 530 (N.D. 1970); Bertera's
Hopewell Foodland, Inc. v. Masters, 428 Pa. 20, 236 A.2d 197 (1967), appeal dismissed,
390 U.S. 597 (1968); South Carolina v. Smith, 271 S.C. 317, 247 S.E.2d 331 (1978).
47. Size regulation gauged by the amount of interior customer selling space also has
been employed and upheld. Opinion of the Justices, 108 N.H. 103, 229 A.2d 188 (1967).
But see Boyer v. Ferguson, 192 Kan. 607, 389 P.2d 775 (1964).
48. See statutes considered in Maine v. S.S. Kresge, Inc., 364 A.2d 868 (Me. 1976)
(five or less employees); Giant of Md., Inc. v. State's Attorney, 267 Md. 501, 298 A.2d 427
(1973) (six or less employees); Opinion of the Justices, 108 N.H. 103, 229 A.2d 188 (1967)
(five or less employees); City of Bismarck v. Materi, 177 N.W.2d 530 (N.D. 1970) (three or
less employees); South Carolina v. Smith, 271 S.C. 317, 247 S.E.2d 331 (1978) (three or
less employees).
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upheld schemes which permit employment of up to ten persons on
Sunday.4 9 Judicial approval of regulation by the number of permissible
employees is typified by Richard's Furniture Corp. v. Board of County
Commissioners.5 ° In Richard's the Maryland Court of Appeals upheld a
distinction prohibiting the operation of any retail establishment on
Sunday which employed "more than one person, not including the owner
or proprietor."' 5 ' This numerical distinction was justified on the grounds
that "MT]he operation of large commercial markets or department stores
on Sunday would materially interfere with the recreational atmosphere
52
of the day, while small retail operations will not.",
For those states that utilize the size method of regulation, the most
problematic area has been defining the word "employee": disagreement
arises as to who is and who is not an "employee." For example, in
Maryland, whether or not 'a security guard is to be included as an
"employee" has resulted in variations in statutes within the state.53
Despite the fact that regulation by size has met with more success
54
than has any other method of regulation, it is not without its critics.
In Piggly-Wiggly of Jacksonville v. City of Jacksonville,55 the Supreme
Court of Alabama struck down a size-regulatory closing law as being
arbitrary and unrelated to the purpose of the county blue law. The court
found "no rational reason to distinguish between large stores, i.e., stores
with more than four regular employees [at any time], and small stores,
i.e., stores with less than four regular employees [at any time]. 5 6

176(

49. Woonsocket Prescription Center, Inc. v. Michaelson, 417 F. Supp. 1250 (D.R.I.U
(no more than ten employees); Bertera's Hopewell Foodland, Inc. v. Masters, 428 Pa.

20, 236 A.2d 197 (1967), appeal dismissed, 390 U.S. 597 (1968) (less than ten employees).
50. 233 Md. 249, 196 A.2d 621 (1964).
51. Id. at 256, 196 A.2d at 629 (quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 § 521(b) as amended

(1962)).
52. Id. at 263, 196 A.2d at 629.
53. Compare, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 5 2 1(e) (1976) (Kent County) and
534R(c)(19) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (Harford County) (explicitly excluding security personnel
as an "employee") with 534L(c)(3) (1976) (Baltimore County) and 534N(c)(3) (1976) (Anne

Arundel and Calvert Counties) (not excluding security personnel as an "employee").
54. Piggly-Wiggly v. City of Jacksonville, 336 So. 2d 1078 (Ala. 1976); Boyer v.
Ferguson, 192 Kan. 607, 389 P.2d 775 (1964); Terry Carpenter, Inc. v. Wood, 177 Neb. 515,
129 N.W.2d 475 (1964).
55. 336 So. 2d 1078 (1976).

56. Id. at 1081. The law was held unconstitutional because it violated the federal
equal protection clause, and the federal and state due process clauses.
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[S]uch a designation is not germane to the stated purpose of the
legislation . . .[because] [tihe number of regular employees who
are required to be at work from Monday through Saturday is in no
way relevant to the number of employees who are unable to rest on
Sunday as a result of the57 store by which they are employed
remaining open on Sunday.
Similarly, in Boyer v. Ferguson, 8 the Supreme Court of Kansas held
unconstitutional a classification which allowed grocery stores employing
not more than three employees to be open on Sundays but prohibited all
other such stores.59 The court found that the exemption for so-called
"Mom and Pop" stores "would. . .force customers to cease doing their
business at certain stores, and to shop at other places of business which
are favored under the [law]." 60 Thus, the court concluded that such a
statutory scheme would impermissibly eliminate competition between
smaller grocery stores and grocery stores employing more than three
employees.6 1
Empirically, there seems to be a justifiable rationale for distinguishing between large stores (or shopping centers) and small stores in
deciding which ones should be permitted to open on Sunday - the
operation of large stores may detract from the tranquility of Sunday.
However, the question to be answered is whose tranquility is being
preserved? Certainly workers in small stores have been given no
ttprotection" against Sunday labor, while employees of large establishments who may desire to work are prohibited from so doing. In those
cases upholding regulation by size, it seems that the primary group of
persons whose tranquility is to be preserved is not the workers, but
those persons near large stores who otherwise might be disturbed by the
traffic and noise attendant to Sunday shopping. Because regulation by
size protects workers in "large" businesses and nonworkers near such
businesses, courts appear to have concluded that, despite the failure to
protect employees of small stores, this regulatory method substantially
achieves the objective of providing a day of rest.

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
192 Kan. 607, 389 P.2d 775 (1964).
Id. at 614, 389 P.2d at 781.
Id. at 612, 389 P.2d at 779.
Id. The law was found unconstitutional based upon a Kansas constitutional

provision prohibiting special laws.
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B. Regulation by Type of Business
Another common method of achieving the stated purpose of Sunday
closing laws is to restrict Sunday openings by occupation or type of
business.6 2 This method has met with considerable judicial resistance.63
In Caldor's, Inc. v. Bedding Barn, Inc.,' the Supreme Court of
Connecticut struck down that state's blue laws which permitted many
types of businesses to open on Sunday irrespective of size, but imposed
size limitations solely on retail food stores. Additionally, Connecticut's
blue law had been amended over time to exempt twenty-four categories
of businesses from Sunday prohibitions. Admitting that "[o]ne way to
achieve [the state's] objective would be to permit only a relatively small
number of small establishments, employing only a relatively small
number of employees, to remain open on Sundays,"65 the court stated
that such a rationale had been undermined by the continual addition of
new classes of enterprises which had been exempted from the Sunday
closing law. 66 Thus, the court held that the statute unlawfully
discriminated against retail food stores,6 7 and was unconstitutional
under both state and federal constitutional guarantees of due process
and equal protection. After a thorough examination of Connecticut's
blue law, and of decisions of other states interpreting their respective
laws, the court commented:
[The infirmity in the Connecticut law] only demonstrates once
again the ambiguity inherent in the objective of Sunday closing
laws. In our complex modem society, it is difficult for legislatures to
achieve consensus about rest and recreation without becoming
enmeshed in distinctions and discriminations that unfairly
impose
8
penal sanctions on legitimate commercial enterprises.
The primary difficulty with regulation by type of business is
determining which businesses or occupations are consistent with rest

62. See generally Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 975 (1958).
63. E.g., Elliott v. Arizona, 29 Ariz. 389, 242 P. 340 (1926); Dunbar v. Hoffman, 171
Colo. 481, 468 P.2d 742 (1970); Caldor's Inc. v. Bedding Barn, Inc., 177 Conn. 304, 417
A.2d 343 (1979); Rogers v. Delaware, 57 Del. 334, 199 A.2d 895 (1964); Kelly v.
Blackburn, 95 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1957); Henderson v. Antonacci, 62 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1952);
Rutledge v. Gaylord's, Inc., 233 Ga. 694, 213 S.E.2d 626 (1975); Spartan's Indus., Inc. v.
Oklahoma City, 498 P.2d 399 (Okla. 1972).
64. 177 Conn. 304, 417 A.2d 343 (1979).
65. Id., 417 A.2d at 353.
66. Id.
67. Id., 417 A.2d at 354.
68. Id., 417 A.2d at 353-54.
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and relaxation and which are not. 69 Because of judicial deference to
state legislatures, laws have been upheld even when distinction has
been made within the same business. For example, in Malibu Auto
Parts, Inc. v. Virginia,7" the Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the
conviction of a corporate vendor of automotive parts and supplies who
sold a quart of motor oil on Sunday. The statute prohibiting the sale,
however, did authorize the "[slervicing, fueling and emergency repair of
motor vehicles

. .

.

including the selling of such parts and supplies for

such emergency repairs."'" The defendant argued that, "because 80% of
the items it stock[ed], including motor oil, could fall into the category
which could be considered for an emergency purpose, 7 2 it was exempt
under the statute and should be allowed to operate on Sunday in order
to sell these emergency repair items. 73 The court rejected this argument
and found that, as a "mere seller of automotive parts and supplies,...
even if 80% of its stock consist[ed] of emergency repair items,, 7 4 the
fueling and
exemption for those businesses engaged in the servicing,
75
emergency repair of motor vehicles was not available.
One effect of allowing only certain categories of businesses to
operate on Sunday is that one establishment is permitted to sell certain
items of merchandise while another establishment, which might sell the
same item, is precluded from opening solely because it is a different
"type" of business.7 6 Such laws lessen competition between "different"
businesses which sell identical items. Unless the type of business
operation being regulated has inherent in its nature a limited size, or
clearly can be said not to further the goals of rest and relaxation on
Sundays, no rational distinction can be drawn between establishments
based upon the type of business they conduct. Legislatures which have
recognized this problem have restricted all businesses from opening

69. Seemingly harmless professions, such as barbering have been determined to be

inimical to the day of rest. When the legislatures of Colorado and Delaware determined
that Sunday barbering was inconsistent with the goal of rest and relaxation and made its
practice a criminal offense, the state courts struck down the laws as violative of equal
protection. Dunbar v. Hoffman, 171 Colo. 481, 468 P.2d 742 (1970); Rogers v. Delaware, 57
Del. 334, 199 A.2d 895 (1964).
70. 218 Va. 467, 237 S.E.2d 782 (1977).
71. Id. at 469, 237 S.E.2d at 784, citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-341(a)(4) (1950)

(emphasis deleted).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. See also MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 492 (works of necessity and charity

excepted).
76. See also text at notes 131-35 and 139-40 infra.
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except those which are clearly related to furthering the day of rest or
those necessary for certain emergencies.7 7
C.

Regulation by Type of Commodity Sold

A third method utilized by legislatures to achieve the blue laws'
objectives has been the regulation of the type of commodities which can
be legally sold on Sundays. 7' Using the commodities approach, legislatures seek to exempt from blue law restrictions the sale of those goods
which are consistent with the law's purpose, such as "necessaries" or
recreational items.7 9 "Necessary" commodities include drugs, food,
gasoline and oil; items in the recreational category would be books,
newspapers, magazines, and sporting goods.8 0 Legislatures which have
chosen to list items exempt from Sunday prohibitions, however, have
been faced with an almost impossible subjective task. Such an approach
requires the legislature to list individually every item which legally can
be sold on Sunday. On the other hand, legislatures which have
attempted to define exempt items generically have been faced with
challenges that such descriptions are too vague. 8 1
77. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13-6-1 (1975); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 436.160(1) (Baldwin
1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17 § 3204 (Supp. 1979); W. VA. CODE ANN. 61-10-25, 26
(1977).
78. See generally Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 969, 975 (1958).
79. See, e.g., Vornado, Inc. v. Hyland, 77 N.J. 347, 357, 390 A.2d 605, 611-12 (1978).
Pennsylvania's former blue law, declared unconstitutional in Kroger Co. v. O'Hara
Township, 481 Pa. 101, 392 A.2d 266 (1978), defined "wholesome recreation" (which was
excepted from Sunday prohibitions) as including golf, tennis, boating, swimming, bowling,
basketball, picnicking, shooting at inanimate targets, and similar healthful or recreational exercises and activities. Id. at 107, 392 A.2d at 273. North Dakota's Supreme Court
while acknowledging that "[iany activities (such as shopping) have a double aspect:
providing entertainment or recreation for some [while] entailing labor and workday
tedium for others," nevertheless held that the legislature's broad discretion should be
upheld. City of Bismarck v. Materi, 177 N.W.2d 530, 539 (N.D. 1970).
80. But see Genesco, Inc. v. J.C. Penney Co., 313 So. 2d 20 (Miss. 1975) in which the
court upheld a blue law which prohibited the sale of sports clothing'and paperback books
on Sunday.
81. Whitney Stores, Inc. v. Summerford, 280 F. Supp. 406 (1968) (three-judge court),
aff'd, 393 U.S. 9 (1968); Minnesota v. Target Stores, Inc., 279 Minn. 447, 156 N.W.2d 908
(1968); New York v. Abrahams, 40 N.Y.2d 277, 353 N.E.2d 574, 386 N.Y.S. 2d 661, (1976);
Skagg's Drug Centers, Inc. v. Ashley, 26 Utah 2d 38, 484 P.2d 723 (1971). In Dart Drug
Corp. v. Hechinger Co., 272 Md. 15, 18, 320 A.2d 266, 268 (1974), Maryland's highest court
discussed the meaning of a statutory provision allowing "[dlrugstores whose basic business
is the sale of drugs and related items" (emphasis added) to be open on Sundays. A company
in the home center business (selling lumber, hardware and other general merchandise)
challenged the exemption given a drugstore, because the drugstore "sold over 67% of the
items, in a generic sense, sold by" the home center store, while the latter business was
required to remain closed. Id. at 19, 320 A.2d at 268. The court held that while the related
items need not be all drug related, the drugstore's basic business was clearly not the sale
of drugs. Accordingly, the drugstores were subject to the statutory limitation of six
employees or less. See also State v. Cranston, 59 Idaho 561, 85 P.2d 682 (1938).
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Curious results often occur where the state legislature has failed to
require uniformity in the commodities which can be sold on Sunday. For

example, in certain Maryland counties, retailers are allowed to sell
butter, eggs, cream, soap, meats, toilet goods, camera film, souvenirs,

flowers and shrubs.8 2 In other counties, retailers are prohibited from
selling these identical items.8 3 It is difficult to justify such inconsistency
on the grounds of local custom, tradition and need, when all county laws
are supposed to be consistent with a solitary statewide purpose.
Perhaps the most persuasive criticism of the "commodity approach"
is contained in Terry Carpenter,Inc. v. Wood. 4 In a concurring opinion
Justice Carter of the Supreme Court of Nebraska stated:
Legislatures over the country then attempted to solve the matter by
the commodity approach. But with the coming of the chain store,
and the intermingling of goods in businesses that were formerly
engaged in sales of merchandise in one particular line or field, the
problem became so complex that the commodity approach was
beyond solution. As examples, drug stores sold groceries, grocery
stores sold hardware, and chain stores sold groceries, drugs, garden
tools, and most anything else that could be crowded into the place of
business. Difficulties arose about remaining open to sell permitted
commodities and at the same time being prevented from selling
prohibited commodities. Contradictions that were completely ludicrous resulted. Under some laws a store could sell camera film but
not a camera; it could sell lipsticks but not a mirror; it could sell
comic books but not toys; it could sell a pet bird but not a cage.
Untangling the perplexities of such a situation is comparable to
untangling a barrel of fish hooks. The commodity approach became
confusing, irrational, and inconsistent when measured by the
85
yardstick of uniform classifications.
Despite the definitional problems involved in the commodity
method of regulation, the state courts are split on the validity of this
approach. 6 As a result, several states continue to utilize this method of
enforcing Sunday closing laws.
82. MD.ANN. CODE art. 27, § 521(b) (1976).
83. Id. § 521 (a).
84. 177 Neb. 515, 129 N.W.2d 475 (1964).
85. Id. at 528-29, 129 N.W.2d at 482-83. Justice Carter also stressed that "[t]he
impracticability of classifying by the business or commodity approach is almost
insurmountable." Id. at 529, 129 N.W.2d at 483.
86. The following courts have upheld the commodity approach: McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Whitney Stores, Inc. v. Summerford, 280 F. Supp. 406
(1968) (three-judge court), aff'd, 393 U.S. 9 (1968), Bill Dyer Supply Co. v. Arkansas, 255
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Other Methods of Regulation

In seeking to promote Sunday as a day of rest, legislatures have
also sought to employ other methods of regulation. For example, Rhode
Island has enacted a "maximum hours limitation" which allows licensed
establishments to open on Sundays if they do not have eighty hours of
employment per day in the aggregate for all employees for three months
prior to the date of the license application. 7 Colorado attempted to
regulate trade by geographic area, though its highest court held such
regulation unconstitutional under the state and federal constitutions."8
In Washington, a local ordinance which permitted Sunday sales to
out-of-state residents, but not to state residents,8 9 was declared
unconstitutional.90 Maryland has recently enacted a law, applicable to
the Baltimore metropolitan area, which permits unrestricted Sunday
shopping on the four Sundays before Christmas but restricts trade
during the remaining Sundays of the year. 9 ' Surprisingly, what would
appear to be the most uniform method of regulating Sunday trade prohibiting all business activity on Sundays - was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Illinois because it penalized both
92
"harmful" and "harmless" businesses.
The complexity of Sunday regulation increases when a state
incorporates several methods of regulation at once. In Maryland, for
Ark. 613, 502 S.W.2d 496 (1974), Maine v. Karmil Merchandising Corp., 158 Me. 450, 186
A.2d 352 (1962); Supermkts. Gen. Corp. v. Maryland, 286 Md. 611, 409 A.2d 250 (1979),
cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 45 (1980); Minnesota v. Target Stores, Inc., 279 Minn. 447, 156
N.W.2d 908 (1968) (upholding commodity approach but striking law for vagueness in
defining exempt commodities); Gibson Prods. Co., v. Texas, 545 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. Inc.
1976); Vermont v. Giant of St. Albans Inc., 128 Vt. 539, 268 A.2d 739 (1970); Mandell v.
Haddon, 202 Va. 979, 121 S.E.2d 516 (1961); West Virginia ex. rel. Heck's v. Gates, 149 W.
Va. 421, 141 S.E.2d 369 (1965).
The following courts have struck down the commodity approach: Hughes v.
Reynolds, 223 Ga. 727, 157 S.E.2d 746 (1967); Boyer v. Ferguson, 192 Kan. 607, 389 P.2d
775 (1964); Terry Carpenter, Inc. v. Wood, 177 Neb. 515, 129 N.W.2d 475 (1964); New
York v. Abrahams, 40 N.Y.2d 277, 353 N.E. 2d 574, 386 N.Y.S. 2d 661, (1976); Treasure
City v. Clark, 261 N.C. 130, 134 S.E.2d 97 (1964); Spartan's Indus., Inc. v. Oklahoma City,
498 P.2d 399 (Okla. 1972); Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc. v. Ashley, 26 Utah 2d 38, 484 P.2d
723 (1971); County of Spokane v. Valu-Mart, Inc., 69 Wash. 2d 712, 419 P.2d 993 (1966);
Nation v. Giant Drug Co., 396 P.2d 431 (Wyo. 1964).
87. Woonsocket Prescription Center, Inc. v. Michaelson, 417 F. Supp. 1250, 1254
(D.R.I. 1976) (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-23-2, as amended effective July 1, 1976).
88. Dunbar v. Hoffman, 171 Colo. 481, 468 P.2d 742 (1970). See also Treasure City
Inc. v. Clark, 261 N.C. 130, 134 S.E.2d 97 (1964).
89. Presumably the ordinance was to protect state citizens from the evils of Sunday
shopping.
90. County of Spokane v. Valu-Mart, Inc., 69 Wash. 2d 712, 419 P.2d 993 (1966).
91. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 534L-l(b) (Cum. Supp. 1980).

92. Pacesetter Homes, Inc. v. Village of S. Holland, 18 Ill.
2d 247, 163 N.E.2d 464
(1959).
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example, Sunday sales are simultaneously regulated by the number of
employees, 93 the type of business, 94 the type of commodity, 95 and by the
time of the year.96 Maryland's blue law problems are further compounded by the utilization of different regulatory methods in different
counties, and by the abolition of Sunday closing laws in several of its
97
counties.
III.

SANCTIONS FOR VIOLATION

Legislatures and courts have struggled not only with determining
correct means for achieving blue laws' objectives, but also with selecting
appropriate and effective sanctions for violations of those laws. Blue
laws violations usually are characterized as misdemeanors and, as such,
there are several possible penalties: imprisonment, monetary fines, and
mandatory restitution. Additionally, injunctive relief usually is available to prevent future violations of the law.
The most effective method for deterring Sunday openings appears to
be injunctive. This method directly furthers the purpose desired by
preventing Sunday trade. Failure to obey an injunction can result in
imprisonment for contempt of court. Injunctions are authorized by many
blue laws schemes and have proven to be an effective tool when used. 98
In the spirit of "concerned citizens," competitors have "assisted" law
enforcement officials by filing suit to enjoin other competitors from
violating the law. 99 Surprisingly, injunctions have not been as extensively used by law enforcement officials as might be expected.
Despite the utility of an injunction, the most common penalty is a
fine.' 0 0 Many states use a sliding scale whereby each violation results
in the imposition of a higher fine.' 0 ' For example, in Maryland, under
one of its typical county laws, a first violation results in a maximum
fine of $100, a second violation results in a maximum fine of $500, and a
third violation results in a maximum fine of $500 per employee over the

93. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 534L(c)(3) (1976).
94. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 534L(b) (1976).
95. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 521 (1976).
96. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 534L-1(b) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
97. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 534H & 534J (1976). 98. See, e.g., Gibson Prods. Co. v. Texas, 545 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. 1976). See also Giant of
Md., Inc. v. State's Attorney, 274 Md. 158, 334 A.2d 107 (1975). See generally Annot., 76
A.L.R.2d 874 (1961).
99. See, e.g., Dart Drug Corp. v. Hechinger Co., 272 Md. 15, 320 A.2d 266 (1974);
Genesco, Inc. v. J.C. Penney Co., 313 So. 2d 20 (Miss. 1975).
100. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 521(c) (1976).
101. See, e.g., MD.ANN. CODE art. 27, § 492, et seq. (1976); S.C. CODE ANN. § 53-1-40,
-100 (1976).
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permitted number.' 0 2 Depending on the interpretation of "a violation,"
such fines can be substantial when applied to chain stores that have
multiple branches open on Sunday.' 0 3 Furthermore, fines for an initial
blue law offense can vary greatly - in Maryland the fine for a first
offense ranges from a minimum of $20 to a maximum of $10,000.1°4
The harsh nature of large fines and the disparity in the amounts
within the same jurisdiction have given rise to claims that such fines
Constitute cruel and unusual punishment within the prohibition of the
eighth amendment or, that they violate the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. In Whitney Stores, Inc. v. Summerford,l ' a
three-judge federal district court held that, fines may constitute cruel
and unusual punishment, but the fines imposed under South Carolina's
blue law (ranging from $50 to $250 in the case of a first violation and
$100 to $500 for each subsequent violation) did not violate the eighth
amendment. 0 6 The Whitney Stores court found that "[a] substantial fine
is necessary in situations of this nature in order to prevent businesses
from operating at a large profit and paying a small fine."' 0 7 Similarly,
in Two Guys v. McGinley,' 0 8 the Supreme Court rejected arguments
that variations in fines (depending upon the locality of the violation
within a state) violate the equal protection and due process clauses of
the Constitution. The Court found such variations permissible so long as
09
the fines reasonably relate to enforcement of the law.'
Fines have been relatively ineffective in deterring blue laws
offenses. Usually, because fines are nominal, large merchants (the main
target of most blue law schemes) tend to view them as an acceptable
cost of doing business. However, when fines escalate for subsequent
violations, merchants may be less likely to view these increased fines
as acceptable.

102. MD. ANN.CODE art. 27, § 534T (1976).
103. Balt. Sun, Dec. 28, 1978 § C at 1, col. 1. However, it appears that, at least in
Baltimore County, the state has determined that only a single violation can be charged
even though a corporate entity may have multiple branches open on a particular Sunday.
Balt. Sun, Mar. 19, 1980 § C at 2, col. 4.
104. Harford County can impose the most severe fine for an initial violation of its blue
laws - $10,000. MD.ANN. CODE art. 27, § 534R (1976). At the other end of the scale, a
violation of Maryland's general closing law results in a $20 minimum fine for a first
offense. MD.ANN.CODE 27, § 521(c) (1976).
105. 280 F. Supp. 406 (D.S.C. 1968), aff'd, 393 U.S. 9 (1968).
106. Id. at 411.

107. Id.
108. Two Guys v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961).
109. Id. at 590-91. See also Tinder v. Clarke Auto Co., 238 Ind. 302, 149 N.E.2d 808
(1958). For a further discussion of equal protection challenges to blue laws, see text at
notes 141-70 infra.
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Imprisonment is another frequently authorized sanction for blue
laws violations. This penalty is rarely imposed, and often the sanction is
unavailable until after the occurrence of several offenses. 1 10 When
imprisonment is decreed, it is usually short-term.
Another penalty requires forfeiture of all commodities illegally
exposed for sale on Sundays. New York's highest court invalidated such
a provision on grounds of unconstitutional vagueness."' This sanction
has been rarely enacted.
On balance, because large merchants may disregard nominal fines,
and imprisonment is rarely appropriate, injunctive relief appears to be
the most effective method of deterring blue laws violations. Usually,
large merchants advertise Sunday openings in advance and it seems
relatively simple to obtain injunctive relief since the intention of the
potential violator is documented.
IV.

LEGAL CHALLENGES TO SUNDAY

CLOSING LAWS

Clearly, it is much easier to proclaim Sunday a day of rest than to
enact legislation which fairly achieves the desired goal. Once enacted,
enforcement is difficult. Because of these problems, a torrent of
litigation attacking blue laws schemes has resulted.
There have been three principal objections to blue laws: (1)
substantive - challenges to the stated purpose of the law; (2)
procedural - challenges to the means chosen by the legislature to
effectuate the stated purpose; and (3) preemptive - challenges that a
state blue law conflicts with, and is therefore preempted by, a federal
statute. The primary substantive challenges have been claims that the
laws violate freedom of religion and unlawfully restrain trade. In light
of their religious origin, it is not surprising that legal attacks on
Sunday closing legislation have focused on violation of the first
amendment's freedom of religion clauses. Because such laws have a
direct impact on business enterprise, it is predictable that substantive
challenges have been mounted on grounds of unfair competition or
restraint of trade. The bulk of the litigation has focused on the
procedures used to implement the legislation. Procedural challenges
have asserted federal and state equal protection and due process
violations, discriminatory enforcement and impermissible delegation;
these assertions have been litigated with varied sucess. The newest

110. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 521(c) (1976). But see Ex parte Newman, 9 Cal.
502 (1858).
111. New York v. Abrahams, 40 N.Y.2d 277, 286-87, 353 N.E.2d 574, 579-80, 386
N.Y.S. 2d. 661, 667 (1976).
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attack claims that blue laws are preempted by conflicting federal
legislation, notably the Sherman Act." 2 The diverse results of these
challenges and the seemingly endless litigation demonstrate the
difficulties of drafting effective and legally permissible Sunday closing
laws.
A.

Substantive Challenges
1.

Religion

The first amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
"law[s] respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof."' 1 3 In McGowan v. Maryland"4 and its companion
cases," 5 the Supreme Court rejected the proposition that blue laws
violate these clauses. Writing for an eight to one majority in.
McGowan, Mr. Chief Justice Warren held that the state had a secular
interest in setting one day apart as a day of rest, repose, recreation and
tranquility." 6 Accordingly, the Court found that Maryland's Sunday
blue laws did not violate the establishment clause of the first
amendment. 1 17 Mr. Justice Douglas, accepting the district court judge's
opinion in the companion case of Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super
Market," s dissented. He agreed that the characterization of Massachusetts' Sunday closing law as a civil regulation was "an ad hoc
improvisation made because of the realization that the Sunday law
would be more vulnerable to constitutional attack under the state
Constitution if the religious motivation of the statute were more
explicitly avowed.""' 9
Braunfeld v. Brown, 120 decided at the same time as McGowan, held
that a state's interest in making Sunday the uniform day of rest
superceeded the interest of Orthodox Jewish merchants who closed on
Saturday but opened on Sunday. The Court therefore concluded that the

112. 15 U.S'.C. § 1 (1976).
113. U.S. CONST., amend. 1.
114. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
115. Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt., 366 U.S. 617 (1961); Two Guys, Inc. v.
McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
116. 366 U.S. at 445-50. See also Report of Maryland Senate Comm'n "to study and
investigate the problems of Sabbath observance in [Maryland]" (1959).
117. 366 U.S. at 569. The Court also found that appellants lacked standing to claim
that the law violated the free exercise clause. Id. at 429-30.
118. Id. at 617 (1961).
119. 366 U.S. at 569 (Douglas, J., dissenting), quoting Gallagher v. Crown Kosher
Super Mkt., 176 F. Supp. 466, 473 (1959).
120. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
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free exercise clause of the first amendment had not been violated by the
Pennsylvania statute.
The only reported appellate case holding that a state's blue law
violated freedom of religion was a pre-McGowan case, Ex parte
Newman. 12 1 In Newman a Jewish clothing merchant brought a habeas
corpus action after having been convicted and imprisoned for violating a
state Sabbath closing law. Perhaps because of the severe sanction
imposed, 22 California's Supreme Court held that the law violated the
state constitution's prohibition of compulsory religious observance and
released the petitioner from custody. However, the Newman holding
123
was subsequently overruled in Ex parte Andrews.
The issue of the blue laws' infringement of religion has been
conclusively rejected by the Supreme Court; it therefore, seldom has
been raised by post-McGowan challengers. Expectedly, when it has
been raised it has not met with success. 1 24 Federal and state judiciaries
have concluded, notwithstanding the blue laws' religious origins, that
the laws have been secularized and have a defensible purpose
applicable to all citizens irrespective of religion. 125 Despite this
universal conclusion, many of the most fervent advocates for the
26
maintenance of blue laws continue to come from organized religion.'
To some extent it appears that the public continues to perceive the blue
laws as religious in nature, thereby adding validity to Mr. Justice
Douglas' conclusion that the judicial theory of secularization over time
is merely an "ad hoc improvisation."
2. Restraint of Trade
Sunday closing legislation most directly affects those legitimate
business establishments prohibited from operating on Sundays. Because
lawful competition generally is thought to be healthy and in the public
121. 9 Cal. 502 (1858).
122. Id. at 504. Accused was imprisoned for failure to pay fine and costs imposed for
violation of Sunday closing law.
123. 18 Cal. 678 (1861). California's Supreme Court subsequently held the law
unconstitutional on other grounds in Ex parte Westerfield, 55 Cal. 550 (1880). In 1883, the
California legislature repealed the law.
124. See, e.g., Piggly-Wiggly v. City of Jacksonville, 336 So. 2d 1078 (Ala. 1976) (court
declared law unconstitutional on equal protection grounds, but held that law did not
violate first amendment religion clauses); New York v. Acme Mkt., 37 N.Y.2d 326, 333,
334 N.E.2d 555, 558-59, 372 N.Y.S.2d 590, 596, (1970); Vermont v. Giant of St. Albans,
Inc.,128 Vt. 539, 268 A.2d 739 (1970); West Virginia ex rel. Heck's Inc. v. Gates, 149 W.
Va. 421, 141 S.E.2d 369 (1965); Atlantic Dep't Store, Inc. v. State's Attorney, 22 Md. App.
381, 323 A.2d 617 (1974). See also Opinion of the Justices, 108 N.H. 103, 229 A.2d 188
(1967).
125. See, notes 115 and 124 supra.

126. See, e.g., Balt. Sun, Mar. 21, 1979 § A at 18, col. 4.
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welfare, both federal and state governments have enacted various laws
prohibiting restraints of trade. Under the Sherman Act,' 2 7 conspiracies
to restrain trade or to monopolize business are prohibited by federal
law. Likewise, various state constitutional provisions, as well as state
statutes, declare monopolies contrary to the principles of commerce and
prohibit them.

12 3

Perhaps because blue laws are presumably enacted for the protection of the public welfare, they are seldom challenged as unlawful
restraint of trade. Courts which have considered the question of state
created monopolies have limited their scope of review to the determination of whether such restrictions were reasonably required for the
protection of some public interest.' 2 9 When such restrictions have 130
been
found to be in the public welfare, the schemes have been upheld.
Supermarkets General Corp. v. Maryland 3 ' is one example of an
unsuccessful monopoly-grounded attack on state blue laws. In Supermarkets General the Maryland Court of Appeals held, inter alia, that
Maryland's blue laws scheme did not violate the state's constitutional
prohibition of monopolies. 13 2 The defendants, large merchants charged
with violating two county blue laws, argued that a statewide monopoly
had been created in favor of certain businesses because Sunday business
operations were permitted in some counties, yet prohibited in the

127. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Section 1 provides in part: "Every contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several states, or with foreign nations is declared to be illegal .. "
128. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. II § 19; Miss. CONST. art. VII § 198; TEx. CONST. art. I
§ 26; VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-499 (1975); WASH. CONST. art. XII § 22; MD.CONST., DECL. OF
RIGHTS, art. 41; MD. COMM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-204 (1975 & 1979 Cum. Supp.).
129. Raney v. County Comm'rs, 170 Md. 183, 183 A. 548 (1936).

130. See, e.g., Supermkts. Gen. Corp. v. Maryland, 286 Md. 611, 409 A.2d 250 (1979),
cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 45 (1980).
131. 286 Md. 611, 409 A.2d 250 (1979), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 45 (1980).
132. Maryland's constitutional prohibition against monopolies is contained in article
41 of its Declaration of Rights. In Levin v. Sinai Hosp., 186 Md. 174, 46 A.2d 298 (1946),
the Court of Appeals defined monopoly:
A monopoly within the prohibition of our Declaration of Rights, is a privilege or power
to command and control traffic in some commodity, or the operation of a trade or

business to the exclusion of others, who otherwise would be at liberty to engage
therein, necessarily implying the suppression of competition, and ordinarily causing a

restraint of that freedom to engage in trade or commerce which the citizens enjoys by
common right. A monopoly is more than a mere privilege to carry on a trade or
business or to deal in a specified commodity. It is an exclusive privilege which
prevents others from engaging therein. A grant of privileges, even though monopolistic in character, does not constitute a monopoly in the constitutional sense when
reasonably required for protection of some public interest, or when given in return for
some public service, or when given in reference to some matter not of common right.
Id. at 182-83, 46 A.2d at 302.
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counties where the defendants operated. The defendants contended that
all customers desiring to do business with large retail establishments in
the state were required to travel to certain counties where such large
establishments could operate. The court, however, held that because
large businesses were free to locate or relocate to counties which
permitted Sunday operations, there was no suppression of competition
and no exclusion of these large merchants from the Sunday market.1 33
The court dismissed the economic and practical reasons against
relocation as "matter[s] of business judgment."' 3 4 Thus the court held
that the state scheme which permitted certain counties to have no blue
laws was not violative of Maryland's constitutional prohibition against
monopolies.

135

At least two states have rejected the Maryland court's reasoning
and have implied that Sunday closing laws unlawfully restrain trade.
In Boyer v. Ferguson,'36 the Supreme Court of Kansas struck down that
state's blue laws, stating:
The effect of this Act on the general public would be to force
customers to cease doing their business at certain stores, and to
shop at other places of business which are favored under the Act.
Insofar as the appellees are concerned, the general public can buy
anything that it could buy before the Act, except that the
purchasers would have to look for one of the favored "persons"
under the statute to purchase such items as the appellees are
prohibited from selling. Instead of eliminating any evil a statute
will create or commit evil - that is, it will eliminate the

133. 286 Md. at 626-27, 409 A.2d at 258-59.
134. Id. at 626, 409 A.2d at 258.
135. The implications of the Maryland court's ruling to the business community and
the consumer are substantial. The suggested remedy for the large stores located in
counties prohibiting their Sunday operation is for them to move to other jurisdictions
within the state which would permit Sunday operations. Were such a mass exodus to blue
laws sanctuaries to occur, Maryland's retail industry would become concentrated in
certain counties while the blue laws counties would lose taxes:, and their residents would
lose jobs and shopping facilities. This state of affairs certainly would be inconsistent with
the public welfare.
Recent legislative changes in Maryland's blue laws affecting Baltimore City and
neighboring counties allow Christmas season shopping on the four Sundays preceding
Christmas. See text and note at note 91 supra. While such a change has been welcomed by
large merchants in areas where prohibitions previously precluded Sunday operations year
round, and while this encourages local businesses to remain in their present locales, one
cannot help but wonder how such a qualitative change is consistent with the stated
purpose of the law.
136. 192 Kan. 607, 389 P.2d 775 (1964).
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competition
presently afforded by the appellees and others similarly
1 37
situated.
Similarly, in Kroger Co. v. O'Hara Township, 1 38 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court strictly scrutinized that state's Sunday trading laws
under state constitutional provisions which prohibit, inter alia, the
legislature from passing any special law regulating trade.
While courts, for the most part, have ignored the economic realities
of Sunday closing laws, business groups have used these laws to engage
in a war of economic competition. 3 9 Small merchants seek to exclude
large merchants from Sunday commerce; merchants selling certain
goods seek to exclude competitors selling the same types of goods on
Sundays; and certain types of businesses seek to gain an economic
advantage over other types of businesses irrespective of their common
clientele. From an economic standpoint, such a state of affairs raises
serious questions as to whether blue laws are in fact, in the public
interest - they prevent open competition among all merchants and may
encourage higher prices on Sundays because of the lack of competition.
Furthermore, in jurisdictions such as Maryland, where an individual
can purchase virtually any item he wishes on Sundays, provided he is
willing to travel to the particular county in which Sunday commerce is
allowed, the motivation behind the maintenance of such laws seems to
be that of economic favoritism under the guise of providing a uniform
day of rest.'4 0 Mr. Justice Douglas' "ad hoc improvisation" theory seems
to apply to the economic effects as well as to the religious motivations
behind blue laws legislation.
B. ProceduralChallenges
1.

Equal Protection

Perhaps the most frequent attack on the various blue law schemes
has been the claim that such enactments violate the equal protection
clauses of both federal and state constitutions. While this issue was
raised in McGowan, diverse methods of implementing Sunday closing
legislation have resulted in different holdings depending on the type of
scheme. Most state courts have adopted McGowan's "rational basis

137. Id. at 612, 389 P.2d at 779. The court specifically refused to consider the
fourteenth amendment challenge, holding only that the laws violated the Kansas
Constitution's prohibition of special laws.
138. 481 Pa. 101, 392 A.2d 266 (1978).
139. Balt. Sun, Feb. 2, 1980, § A at 14, col. 1. See also Note, Sunday Laws, 42 N.C. L.
REv. 148 (1964).
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test," but have not felt constrained to follow McGowan's holding. The
"rational basis test" set forth in McGowan states:
[T]he Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a wide scope of
discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens
differently than others. The constitutional safeguard is offended
only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the
achievement of the State's objective. State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the
fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A
statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts
reasonably may be conceived to justify it.' 4 '
Even though blue laws must be upheld if any state of facts reasonably
may be conceived to justify them, a majority of state courts have
determined that classifications in their state's respective schemes rest
on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the state's
objective.

1 42

Despite almost universal acceptance of the rational basis test as
applied to Sunday closing legislation, in Kroger Co. v. O'Hara
Township,'4 3 Pennsylvania's Supreme Court applied a more strict test
to its blue laws when it considered a challenge based upon the state
constitution's guarantee of equal protection. The court suggested that
blue laws might be subject to a "strict scrutiny" test which requires a
state to show a compelling interest in order to justify a statutory scheme
creating distinctions. 14 However, the court adopted an intermediate
test (between strict scrutiny and McGowan's rational basis) when it
required Pennsylvania's blue laws to demonstrate "a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly
situated shall be treated alike.' 145 A majority held that "we would not
140. Courts have been reluctant to consider the economic motivations and special
interests in connection with blue laws. See, e.g., New York v. Abrahams, 40 N.Y.2d 277,
283, n.4, 353 N.E.2d 574, 577 n.4, 386 N.Y.S. 2d 661, 667 n.4 (1976), ("[I]t is beyond the
province of the judiciary to hypothesize about the motives of legislators and whether or not
portions of a statute are attributable to the efforts of so-called special interests.") Genesco,
Inc. v. J.C. Penney Co., 313 So. 2d 20 (Miss. 1977). Contra, Skag-Way Dep't Stores, Inc. v.
Omaha, 179 Neb. 707, 140 N.W.2d 28 (1966); Terry Carpenter, Inc. v. Wood, 177 Neb. 515,
129 N.W.2d 475 (1964).
141. 366 U.S. at 425-26. Accord, New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
142. See note 11 supra.
143. 481 Pa. 101, 392 A.2d 266 (1978).
144. Id. at 117, 392 A.2d at 274. The "strict scrutiny" test ordinarily is applied to
"inherently suspect" classifications, such as race or religion. See P. FREUND, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: CASES AND OTHER PROBLEMS

914-16 (4th ed. 1977).

145. 481 Pa. at 119, 392 A.2d at 275.
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be discharging our obligation to protect the constitutional guarantees
were we not to require the statutory classifications to substantially
further the statutory objective.' 4 6
Equal protection challenges to Sunday closing law schemes necessarily have focused on the alleged absence of relevance to the state's
objective. Many of the schemes have been accused of no longer
furthering their objective because myriad exceptions have been engrafted upon the law. Additionally, it has been claimed that the entire
scheme is violated when the state enacts county blue laws and allows
some, but not all, counties within the state to approve the laws by
referendum. 147 Finally, statutory distinctions pertaining to businesses
or commodities excluded from Sunday closing laws have been attacked
as lacking a rational relationship to the purported objective of the
148
laws.
Several recent cases have found statewide Sunday closing legislation to be violative of equal protection. In New York v. Abrahams,149 the
New York Court of Appeals struck down New York's prohibitions
against sales on Sunday. In recognizing that "the notion of a quiet
Sunday is unquestionably valid in principle,"' 5 0 the court held that the
"gallimaufry of exceptions [to the law had] obliterated any natural
nexus" between the law and its purpose.' 5 ' After tracing the progressive
deterioration of the law and acknowledging that "there may be
arbitrary distinctions as part of a rational pattern,"'5 2 the court
determined that "a modicum of rationality [was] required for the statute
to be valid. '' 15 3 In a concurring opinion, Judge Fuchsberg advanced a
warning to legislatures that constantly tamper with their blue laws:
[T]he statute is not the product of a single, conceptually cohesive
legislative plan, but, instead, the consequence of years of patching
and filling by the Legislature as it attempted to keep up with
rapidly changing societal patterns and needs. Under such circumstances, it was almost inevitable that a time would come when the

146. Id. at 122, 392 A.2d at 276. The dissent criticized the majority's abandonment of
the McGowan test. Id. at 128-30, 392 A.2d at 279-80.
147. See, e.g., Supermkts. Gen. Corp. v. Maryland, 286 Md. 611, 409 A.2d 250 (1979),
cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 45 (1980).
148. Id. at 617, 409 A.2d at 253.
149. 40 N.Y.2d 277, 353 N.E.2d 574, 366 N.Y.S. 2d. 661 (1976).
150. Id. at 279-80, 353 N.E.2d at 575, 386 N.Y.S. 2d. at 662.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 284, 353 N.E.2d at 578, 386 N.Y.S. 2d. at 669.
153. Id. The court did not indicate whether the blue laws were infirm under a federal
or state equal protection guarantee.
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patchwork no longer made any sense.4 I share my brother Judges'
view that that moment has arrived.'
Similarly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down its state's
patchwork of blue laws in Kroger Co. v. O'Hara Township. 5 ' The
Kroger holding is interesting because in an earlier case, Two Guys v.
McGinley,' the United States Supreme Court upheld a portion of the
laws against a federal equal protection challenge. The majority in
Kroger attempted to distinguish Two Guys (and other Pennsylvania
Supreme Court cases which upheld the laws) by asserting that Kroger
raised, for the first time, a state constitutional challenge to the state
scheme in its entirety, as opposed to federal challenges aimed at specific
provisions. The dissent found this distinction unpersuasive and noted
that the statute struck down by the majority differed little from those
provisions upheld by the Supreme Court in Two Guys.'5 7 Although the
majority purported to rely on Pennsylvania constitutional law, they
apparently no longer found Two Guys persuasive but instead chose to
follow the trend of other state courts that have held their blue laws to
be unconstitutional.
In Caldor's, Inc. v. Bedding Barn, Inc.,15 8 Connecticut's highest
court held its statewide Sunday closing law to be violative of state and
federal equal protection due to "the steady addition of new classes of
enterprises exempted from the . . . law."' 5 9 The law exempted some
twenty-four categories of businesses, reguardless of their size, which
could sell almost any item, but imposed size restrictions on retail food
stores. The court found such exemptions too arbitrary, discriminatory
and unreasonable to comport with equal protection and due process.'i s
In contrast, Massachusetts' Sunday closing laws were upheld in
Zayre Corp. v. Attorney General16 ' despite the court's acknowledgment
that the law's forty-nine exceptions could not be said to comprise a
ttcohesive" scheme. Even though the court evaluated the exemptions
qualitatively with respect to their relationship to the law's objective, the

154. Id. at 289-90, 353 N.E. at 581-82, 386 N.Y.S. 2d. at 669.
155. 481 Pa. 101, 392 A.2d 266 (1978).
156. 366 U.S. 582 (1961).
157. 481 Pa. 101, 130, 392 A.2d 266, 280 (1978) (Eagen, C.J., dissenting).
158. 177 Conn. 304, 417 A.2d 343 (1979).
159. Id., 417 A.2d at 353.
160. Id. The court did suggest that "[olne way to achieve the [blue law's] objective
would be to permit only a relatively small number of small establishments, employing
only a relatively small number of employees, to remain open on Sundays." Id. See also text
accompanying notes 65-69 supra.
161. 372 Mass. 423, 362 N.E.2d 878. (1977).
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court seemed to recognize the quantitative threshold stated in Abrahams that exemptions may become "so numerous that Sunday [becomes]
62
a day of rest in name only."'
Likewise, in Supermarkets General Corp. v. Maryland,1 63 two

statutes comprising but a small part of Maryland's extensive and varied
blue law scheme were upheld despite an equal protection "patchwork"
challenge. Relying on Maryland's legislative practice to enact local
laws, and the legislature's prerogative to allow each county to
determine Sunday closings by local option, the court refused to find that
wide disparities in county laws violated equal protection or due
process.' 6 4 The county laws at issue allowed establishments employing
fewer than six or eight persons to open on Sundays; the only other
establishments permitted to open on Sundays were those few businesses
which the court found were either rationally related to health or
recreation, or whose nature required operation during all seven days of
the week. 165 The Maryland Court of Appeals upheld the Baltimore and
Anne Arundel County laws, reasoning that "[t]he limitation of the
number of persons on a shift assures that a number of employees of
large establishments will be afforded the day of rest sought by the
laws."' 6 6 The Supermarkets General court also found that equal
protection was not violated because the legislature permitted some, but
not all, Maryland counties to hold referenda on the abolition of blue
67

laws. 1

Unlike the Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and New York courts,
the Maryland court in Supermarkets General declined to acknowledge
that numerous changes or exceptions to blue laws could, at some point,

162. Id. at 435, 362 N.E.2d at 885.
163. 286 Md. 611, 409 A.2d 250 (1979), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 45 (1980).
164. Id. Accord, Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545, 552 (1954); Steimel v. Board of
Election Supervisors, 278 Md. 1, 357 A.2d 386 (1976).
The court found that the laws violated neither the fourteenth amendment to the
Constitution, nor article 24 of Maryland's Declaration of Rights (state due process
provision).
165. 286 Md. at 618-19, 409 A.2d at 254.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 620-23, 409 A.2d at 255-57. In all other states known to provide for a
county-by-county determination on blue laws for citizens of that locality, legislatures have
given all counties in the state an equal opportunity to enact or nullify such laws. See
Rutledge v. Gaylord's Inc., 233 Ga. 694, 213 S.E.2d 626 (1975); Maine v. S.S. Kresge Inc.,
364 A.2d 868 (Me. 1976); Vornado, Inc. v. Hyland, 77 N.J. 347, 390 A.2d 606 (1978). See
also Malibu Auto Parts, Inc. v. Virginia, 218 Va. 467, 237 S.E.2d 782 (1977), where the
issue was raised for the first time on appeal, and for that reason the court refused to rule
on it.
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destroy the law's rationality. 6 ' Instead the court suggested that the
legislature should remedy possible defects:
The Maryland Sunday Blue Laws have been soundly denounced by
some persons. They have been characterized as unwise, complex, a
patchwork, a crazy quilt, a labyrinth, a legal maze, unnecessarily
befuddling statutory crabgrass, an inconvenience, a hypocrisy. But
even if they were, they could not for those reasons be voided by the
judiciary. As we have indicated, absent some constitutional infirmity the judiciary simply has no power to interfere. We have
determined that § 534L and § 534N, contrary to appellants' contentions, are constitutionally valid. The statutes must stand firm until
the General Assembly of Maryland changes them. If it concludes
that the public welfare requires that Sunday business activities no
longer be proscribed in Baltimore County and Anne Arundel
County, or in fact in any other county, or city or
town, it has the
169
power and the means to effectuate its conclusion.
Equal protection remains a potentially successful avenue to attack
blue laws schemes which have become so riddled with exceptions that
they no longer bear a rational relation to the law's purpose. Crucial to
such analysis is the scope of the legislation to be reviewed. The New
York, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut courts chose to review entire state
schemes; the wide scope of analysis presented the courts with numerous
exceptions and disparities to invalidate their laws. The analysis used by
these courts in dealing with "patchwork" blue laws is persuasive, and
the quantitative standards they applied lend themselves to precedential
use in other states. In contrast, Maryland's refusal to acknowledge the
erosive effects of numerous exceptions to a blue law scheme seems to be
premised solely upon excessive deference to the legislature. It would
seem beyond dispute that any law may violate its raison d'etre when
exceptions to the law become the rule.
2. Due Process
A corollary to the equal protection challenge is the claim that blue
170
laws violate due process. In SupermarketsGeneral Corp. v. Maryland,
the court stated:

168. Id. at 620-24, 409 A.2d at 255-57.
169. Id. at 629, 409 A.2d at 260 (emphasis added). In the Report of the Governor's
Commission to Study the Operation of the Sunday Blue Laws (1975), see note 29 supra,
the Commission recommended the repeal of the entire state scheme.
170. 286 Md. 611, 409 A.2d 250 (1979), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 45 (1980).
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The test for constitutionality under the due process clause is
whether a statute, as an exercise of the state's police power, bears a
real and substantial relation to the public health, morals, safety,
and welfare of the citizens of the state . .

. The exercise by the

Legislature of the police power will not be interfered with unless it
arbitrarily, oppressively or unreasonably.
is shown to be exercised
17 1
(citation omitted).

Despite the assertion by Maryland's highest court that "[t]here is no
practical distinction between the grounds [of equal protection and due
process]

'1 72

some courts have found separate violations of due process

without relying on equal protection. For example, in Kelly v.
Blackburn,1 73 Florida's Supreme Court struck down its state blue law
which prohibited all Sunday commerce except the operation of movie
theatres and the printing and sale of newspapers, finding that even such
limited exemptions were not sufficiently related to the "public health,
safety, morals or general welfare."'174 The court reiterated a statement
from a previous Florida case that the closing of all businesses on Sunday
did bear "rational and reasonable relationship to the public health,
safety, morals or general welfare because. . . protection is afforded all
citizens from the evils attendant upon uninterrupted labor."'175 Paradoxically, in Pacesetter Homes, Inc. v. Village of South Holland'76 the
Supreme Court of Illinois reached the same result but for another
reason. In Pacesetter,a blue law which prohibited all business activity
per se was held to be arbitrary because it prohibited the operation of
"harmless" as well as "harmful" businesses. 177 The court found that
those businesses which had no tendency to affect or endanger the public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare could not be prohibited from
Sunday commerce under the state's police power. Thus, even in the
presumably simple case of uniform prohibition, the courts are in
disagreement.

171. Id. at 618, 409 A.2d at 254, quoting Bowie Inn v. City of Bowie, 274 Md. 230, 236,
335 A.2d 679, 683 (1975). Accord, Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 124-25
(1978).

172. 286 Md. at 618, 409 A.2d at 254.
173. 95 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1957). For other cases striking down blue laws on due process
grounds, see Henderson v. Antonacci, 62 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1952); Spartan's Indus., Inc. v.
Oklahoma City, 498 P.2d 399 (Okla. 1972); Nation v. Giant Drug, 396 P.2d 431 (Wyo.
1964). See also County of Spoane v. Valu-Mart, Inc., 69 Wash. 2d 712, 419 P.2d 993 (1966).
Contra, Gibson Prods. Co., v. Texas, 545 S.W.2d 128 (1976).
174. 95 So. 2d at 262.
175. Id.
176. 18 Il. 2d 247, 163 N.E.2d 464 (1959).
177. Id. at 255, 163 N.E.2d at 469.
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Several state courts have reviewed statutory language claimed to
be vague and therefore violative of due process. 1 78 For example,
Minnesota's provision restricting the sale of certain commodities on
Sunday was held unconstitutionally vague, and thereby violative of
fourteenth amendment due process, in Minnesota v. Target Stores,
Inc.1 79 The court held that the designation of certain restricted
commodities as "home appliances" and "home furnishings" was so
unclear that it failed to give merchants proper notice of prohibited
items. 8 0° Similarly, the Supreme Court of Utah, in Skaggs Drug
Centers, Inc. v. Ashley,' 8 1 struck down its state's Sunday closing law on
vagueness grounds, the court held that exemptions for "goods or the
rendering of services necessary to the maintenance of health, safety or
life, such as . . . medical or hospital goods or services or prescription
medicine ' 1s 2 were impermissibly vague and violated due process.
On the other hand, arguably "vague" designations such as "garden
and lawn supplies" were upheld against a due process challenge in
Genesco, Inc. v. J. C. Penney Co.' 83 Likewise, in Malibu Auto Parts v.
Virginia, 84 Virginia's Supreme Court held that the term "emergency,"
when applied to motor vehicle repairs on Sunday, was sufficiently
85
precise to withstand a vagueness challenge. In McGowan v. Maryland1
the Supreme Court rejected a claim that portions of Maryland's 1961
blue laws were unconstitutionally vague; rather, the Court found that
"business people of ordinary intelligence would be able to know what
exceptions are encompassed by the statute .
as a matter of ordinary
86
commercial knowledge."'
While there is disagreement among cases regarding what is
acceptable regulatory language, some general propositions emerge.

178. See generally Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 763 (1963).
179. 279 Minn. 447, 156 N.W.2d 908 (1968). See also Henderson v. Antonacci, 62 So. 2d
5 (Fla. 1952) (Drew, J., concurring).
180. 279 Minn. at 468-69, 156 N.W.2d at 921-22.
181. 26 Utah 2d 38, 484 P.2d 723 (1971).
182. Id. at 41, 484 P.2d at 724, citing Laws of Utah 25 § 5(1) (1970).
183. 313 So. 2d 20, 22 (Miss. 1975). In Genesco, a microcosm of the irrationality in
certain blue laws was Mississippi's particularly mystifying distinction between non-power
operated toiletries, showering and grooming supplies which were permitted to be sold on
Sundays and similar items which were prohibited because they were operated by power.
See also Whitney Trading Corp. v. McLeod, 255 S.C. 8, 176 S.E.2d 572 (1970) (holding that
commodity classifications in law were not unconstitutionally vague).
184. 218 Va. 467, 237 S.E.2d 782 (1977).
185. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
186. Id. at 428. See also Giant of Md., Inc. v. State's Attorney, 267 Md. 501, 298 A.2d
427 (1973), appeal dismissed, 412 U.S. 915 (1973), (upholding other sections of Maryland's
blue laws against a vagueness attack).
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When state regulations list specific items which can or cannot be sold on
Sundays, and when such designations bear a rational relationship to the
blue law's purpose, those provisions will likely be defensible against a
vagueness attack. Conversely, statutory language is more vulnerable to
a vagueness challenge when it attempts to exempt certain businesses by
type or describes general categories of goods permissible for Sunday
sale.
Although closely related to equal protection, due process remains as
a distinct and viable tack to challenge blue laws. One important factor
is the difference in tests. The test for a violation of due process, while
strict, may be more easily satisfied than McGowan's rational basis
test.18 7 Under the due process test the law must bear a "real and
substantial relation" to the public welfare, while under the test for
equal protection the law will be upheld if any state of facts reasonably
may be conceived to justify it.'..
3. DiscriminatoryEnforcement
Validly enacted blue laws sometimes have been challenged on
grounds that the laws have been enforced in an arbitrary and
discriminatory manner. As stated by the New York Court of Appeals in
18 9

New York v. Acme Markets, Inc.:

Discriminatory enforcement as a defense to a criminal action
derives from the Federal and State constitutional guarantee of
equal protection of the law. .

.

. The underlying concept is

elemental - that persons similarly situated should be treated the
same and that criminal justice should and must be evenly and
equally dispensed.' 90
In Acme Markets the court found that the blue law in question violated
the equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions
because there was no policy of general enforcement, a history of disuse
of the law, and a policy of prosecution only when private citizens
complained to enforcement authorities. 19 1 Similarly, in City of Ashland
187.
188.
supra.
189.
190.
191.

See text accompanying note 141 supra.
Compare text accompanying note 171 supra with text accompanying note 141
37 N.Y.2d 326, 334 N.E.2d 555, 372 N.Y.S.2d 590 (1975).
Id. at 330, 334 N.E.2d at 557, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 593.
Id. at 331-32, 334 N.E.2d at 558, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 594. Three members of the

court stated that the law was unconstitutional because of a "polyglot of exceptions to the
general closing mandate." Id. at 333, 334 N.E.2d at 559, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 596. The
majority, while expressing reservations about the rationality of the statute, failed to reach
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v. Heck's, Inc.,' 9 2 the Kentucky Court of Appeals found discriminatory
enforcement of that state's blue laws. Although the court acknowledged
the facial validity of Kentucky's Sunday closing law, it granted an
injunction in favor of a department store, finding that the store was the
only entity in the city found guilty of violating the law in twenty-five
years. 193
Mere lack of uniformity in enforcing blue laws is insufficient to
establish discriminatory enforcement; 194 only purposeful or intentional
discrimination is prohibited.' 9 5 Discriminatory purpose will not be
presumed 1 96 and a heavy burden is placed upon those claiming
discriminatory enforcement (in part because of the violator's "lack of
clean hands"). 1 97 Accordingly, discriminatory enforcement is a difficult
defense on which to prevail. It appears that this defense is most
successful when law enforcement officials only enforce the law when
asked to do so by merchant-competitors or other special interest
1 98

groups.

4. Claims Based Upon ParticularState
ConstitutionalProvisions
In addition to the procedural challenges based upon federal
statutory and constitutional provisions, there are also numerous other
potential attacks based upon unique state constitutional provisions.
Sunday closing legislation has been challenged on grounds that the

the issue of constitutionality on this basis, but struck the law down on the grounds of
discriminatory enforcement. Id. at 331, 334 N.E.2d at 558, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 594. One year
later in New York v. Abrahams, 40 N.Y.2d 277, 353 N.E.2d 574 (1976), the law was struck
down as an unconstitutional "patchwork" no longer having a rational relationship to the
purpose of the law.
192. 407 S.W.2d 421 (Ky. 1966).
193. Id. at 424. The court noted that other establishments such as pharmacies,
groceries and car washes were permitted to open on Sundays. Despite leaving its blue law
intact, the court characterized the law as a "poor" one.
194. Giant of Md., v. State's Attorney, 267 Md. 501, 517, 298 A.2d 427, 436 (1973);
Zayre Corp. v. Attorney General, 372 Mass. 423, 441, 362 N.E.2d 878, 888 (1977); New
York v. Acme Mkts., Inc. 37 N.Y.2d 326, 330, 334 N.E.2d 555, 557, 372 N.Y.S.2d 590, 594
(1975).
195, New York v. Acme Mkts., Inc., 37 N.Y.2d 326, 330, 334 N.E.2d 555, 557, 372
N.Y.S.2d 590, 594 (1975); Whitney Trading Corp. v. McNair, 255 S.C. 8, 12, 176 S.E.2d
572, 574 (1970).
196. Whitney Trading Corp. v. McNair, 255 S.C. 8, 12, 176 S.E.2d 572, 574 (1978).
197. See, e.g., New York v. Acme Mkts., Inc., 37 N.Y.2d 326, 331, 334 N.E.2d 555,
557-58, 312 N.Y.S.2d 590, 594 (1975); City of Ashland v. Heck's Inc., 407 S.W.2d 421, 426
(Ky. 1966) (Montgomery, J., dissenting).
198. See, e.g., New York v. Acme Mkts., Inc., 37 N.Y.2d 326, 334 N.E.2d 555, 312
N.Y.S.2d 590 (1975).
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enacted laws constitute an impermissible delegation of legislative power
to counties, 19 9 that the laws violate state constitutional provisions
prohibiting special laws, 20 0 and that the laws violate state constitutional provisions requiring all laws of a general nature to have a uniform
operation throughout the state. 20 1 Because such claims are based upon a
precise state constitutional provision and a state's particular blue law,
many of these challenges are of limited precedential value outside of the
borders of the particular state. It is worth emphasizing, however, that
should a state court find challenges based upon the Federal Constitution
unpersuasive, provisions of the particular state constitution might
remain available as a ground to challenge the Sunday closing legislation.
C. Preemptive Challenges
Recently, Sunday closing legislation has been attacked on the basis
of the supremacy clause of the Federal Constitution, contained in article
IV, section 2. The supremacy clause provides that the Constitution and
the laws of the United States made pursuant thereto "shall be the
supreme Law of the Land." Appellants in Gibson Distributing Co. v.
Downtown Development Association.20 2 argued that Texas' blue laws
were preempted by the Sherman Act,20 3 a federal act passed pursuant to
the Constitution. The Texas Supreme Court rejected this argument
holding, that under Parker v. Brown,20 4 "state action affecting commerce is generally considered to be exempted from the Sherman Act."20 5
While recognizing that "[n]ot every act of a state or local subdivision
necessarily comes within the exception to the Sherman Act, ' 20 6 the
court determined that Sunday blue laws were not preempted by the
federal law. Accordingly, Texas' blue laws were upheld.
No other reported case has raised this issue. However, this new
approach indicates the continuing opposition to Sunday closing legislation and the constant search for new grounds upon which to challenge
such laws.
199. Arlan's Dep't. Stores v. Kelley, 374 Mich. 70, 130 N.W.2d 892 (1964).
200. See, e.g., Kroger Co. v. O'Hara Township, 481 Pa. 101, 392 A.2d 266 (1978);
McKair v. Kansas City, 363 Mo. 1033, 256 S.W.2d 815 (1953); Treasure City v. Clark, 261
N.C. 130, 134 S.E.2d 97 (1964).
201. Boyer v. Ferguson, 192 Kan. 607, 389 P.2d 775 (1964); Brown Enterprises v.
Fulton, 192 N.W.2d 773 (Iowa 1972).
202. 572 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. 1978), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 1000 (1978).
203. See text accompanying note 127 supra.
204. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
205. 572 S.W.2d at 335.
206. Id.
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V.

CONCLUSION

While Sunday closing laws have been consistently upheld when
they properly implement the legitimate state purpose of.providing rest,
relaxation and tranquility, the plethora of litigation demonstrates a
variety of problems in achieving the state objective by use of the
criminal law. The threshold question is whether such laws carry out
their stated purpose.
Despite unequivocal assertions by both the United States Supreme
Court and state supreme courts that all citizens are to be protected,
many laws do not carry out this purpose. There seem to be two primary
groups protected by blue laws: those persons who, but for the legislation,
would be required by their employer to work on Sundays; and those
persons who, while not required to labor on Sunday, nevertheless would
be denied rest, relaxation and tranquility by the disruptive activities of
fellow citizens. The overwhelming majority of laws, while paying lip
service to their purported objective, do not, in fact, protect all citizens in
the particular jurisdiction. In states allowing only small businesses to
open on Sundays, employees working for such businesses must still
work on the day of rest. Other statutes, such as article 27, Section 534J
of the Annotated Code of Maryland, totally ignore the segment of the
population who, despite not laboring on Sunday, arguably have their
day of rest disrupted. Pursuant to Maryland's law, businesses are
allowed to operate without restriction subject to the rights of employees
to choose Sunday or their Sabbath as a day of rest. Such a law protects
only workers, not nonworkers, and therefore does not guarantee a day
of rest for all citizens.
The split of judicial authority on the validity of various legal
schemes makes it apparent that state legislatures are the branch of
government primarily responsible for rectifying alleged injustices of
certain blue laws. The fact that legislatures have had so much difficulty
enacting or repealing Sunday closing laws is not surprising since the
public constituency is divided. Business establishments prohibited from
Sunday operation, willing Sunday workers, recreational shoppers and
persons who are unable to shop during the week favor the abolition of
blue laws. Many religious organizations, employees who may have to
work on Sundays, and businesses exempted under the law favor the
laws' continued existence. As with other controversial public issues,
perhaps a referendum (either statewide for state laws, or local for local
laws) would be a preferable method of determining the will of the
public.
Enforcement of laws prohibiting what is lawful commercial activity
six days of the week but unlawful one day of the week, saps precious
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resources. Instead of performing other more necessary duties, police are
required to gather evidence, issue citations against business establishments and managerial employees, and appear at trials of violators.
Certainly, the waste of valuable police and judicial time and effort
brings into question the use of the criminal law to further a day of rest.
Perhaps the most persuasive argument against Sunday closing laws
is neither a legal nor an administrative one: why must citizens be
restricted under penalty of criminal sanctions from engaging in what
otherwise would be lawful business activity - to shop on Sundays, or to
work on Sundays to gain extra income? If the true goal of the legislature
is to prevent forced Sunday labor, that objective can be achieved in a
more limited fashion. Certainly it can no longer be persuasively argued
that the closing of businesses alone transforms Sunday into a peaceful
day. With a multitude of other activity on Sunday, the interest of the
populace in seeking rest and relaxation needs no criminal enforcement.
No one is required to shop on Sundays; no one is required to leave the
peace and quiet of his residence.
The patchwork of exceptions to blue laws not only demonstrates the
influence of certain economic groups, but also shows the futility of
applying a three hundred year old religious law to today's modem
society. When various subdivisions within a state scheme are allowed to
have widely divergent laws, all containing their own exceptions, it is
obvious that the law has become a tool for special interests, rather than
a law benefiting all citizens.
Each state legislature must determine its true objective, evaluate
its law in light of that objective, and if deemed appropriate, enact
legislation to achieve the goal in the most narrow fashion so as to
prevent interference with the rights of others. So long as Sunday closing
legislation exists in its present form, legal challenges likely will
continue.

